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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) T h e district court found that several provisions
of the A l a b a m a Constitution of 1901 w e r e adopted for the
purpose of limiting the imposition on whites of property
taxes that w o u l d p a y for the education of black public
school students. T h efirstquestion presented is:
D o black public school children a n d their
parents have standing to challenge the validity
u n d e r the E q u a l Protection Clause of state
constitutional provisions a d o p t e d for the
purpose of limiting the imposition on whites of
property taxes that would b e used to educate
black public school students?
(2) In 2004 the District J u d g e in Knight v.
Alabama
held that certain aspects of A m e n d m e n t s 3 2 5 a n d 3 7 3
to the A l a b a m a Constitution w e r e adopted for racially
discriminatory reasons. In 2011 the District J u d g e in
the instant case, applying different legal standards,
concluded that the A m e n d m e n t s w e r e enacted for a n o n discriminatory purpose. T h e second question presented
is:
W h i c h district j u d g e applied the correct
constitutional standard?
(3) T h e district court in the instant case found that
prior to 1971 real property in A l a b a m a w a s assessed
far below its fair m a r k e t value, a n d that the "primar[y]"
reason for those low assessments w a s to protect white
landowners from paying property taxes that w o u l d b e
u s e d to educate black public school students.
After

ii
1971 Alabama adopted two constitutional amendments
whose purpose, the court of appeals recognized, was to
"entrench" those race-based pre-1971 assessments. The
third question presented is:
Is the Equal Protection Clause violated by a
state constitutional amendment adopted for the
purpose of entrenching pre-existing race-based
property tax assessments?
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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The petitioners are India Lynch, by her parent Shawn
King Lynch, Wendell Pride, Jr., by his parent Wendell
Pride, Ivy Rose Ball, by her parent Miranda Ball, Slade
Berryman and Cannon Berryman, by their parent Tyler
Berryman, Rochester Anderson and Cezanne Anderson,
by their parent Stella Anderson, Michael R a y m o n d
Brooks, by his parent Michael Brooks, Zekeiah O r m o n d ,
by his parent Barbara L . O r m o n d . This action was filed
as a class action on behalf of all black and white public
school students in Alabama.
The defendants are the state of Alabama, Robert
Bentley, in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama,
and Julie P. Magee, in her official capacity as Commissioner
of Revenue.
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Petitioners India Lynch, et al., respectfully pray
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of
Appeals entered on January 10, 2014.

OPINIONS B E L O W
The January 10, 2104 opinion of the court of appeals,
which is reported at 739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014), is
set out at pp. 1a-29a of the Appendix. T h e November 7,
2011 opinion of the district court, which is not officially
reported, is set out at pp. 30a-1097a of the Appendix.

JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered on
January 10, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U . S . C . § 1254(1).

STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The statutory and constitutional provisions involved
are set out in the petition appendix.

STATEMENT OF T H E CASE
Introduction
This is a case of truly exceptional importance, one
which will determine whether tens of thousands of public
school children in the state of Alabama will continue
to be denied an adequate education "in underfunded,
dilapidated schools." (App.l044a). In 1875, 1901, 1971
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and 1978 A l a b a m a adopted a series of constitutional
provisions which increasingly constricted the authority
of local elected officials to levy property taxes for the
public schools. Those Alabama constitutional restrictions
have "had a crippling effect on poor, majority black school
districts." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1299
(N.D.Al??a. 2004); App.109a. T w o federal trial judges
concluded that some or all of those state constitutional
constraints were adopted for the purpose of protecting
white landowners from having to pay property taxes
that would be used to educate black students. But the
lower courts in this case, applying legal standards that
are clearly inconsistent with the decisions of this Court,
denied any remedy to those students.
Property taxes in Alabama are largely governed
by two elements: the tax (or "millage") rate and the
assessed valuation. The tax rate is expressed in mills; 1
mill represents a tax rate of 0.1 %. The millage rates for
county and state property taxes in Alabama were first
limited by provisions of the 1875 Constitution, and again
capped by provisions of the 1901 Constitution, which (with
some modification) remain in effect today. County (and
other local) officials m a y not impose a property tax in
excess of those constitutionally imposed limitations except
by m e a n s of a constitutional amendment, or by using
a complex process that requires approval by the state
legislature. (App.10a). The assessed value of property was
limited by constitutional amendments adopted in 1971
and 1978. A s a result of those amendments, the assessed
value of property in Alabama is required to be far lower
than its actual fair market value. T h e overwhelming
majority of local funds for public schools is derived from
local property taxes, and a large majority of all property
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taxes In Alabama is used to support the public schools. A s
a practical matter, any state restriction on locally imposed
property taxes is a limitation on the ability of local officials
to fund the public schools.
T h e 1875 and 1901 Constitutional Limits on Millage
Rates
T h e A l a b a m a constitutional restrictions on the mill
rates that can be adopted by county officials to levy
taxes for the public schools were a direct response to
events that occurred during Reconstruction. Republican
officeholders had increased millage rates, and devoted
m u c h of the n e w revenue to education. "[B]lacks received
the bulk of the benefits of the increased tax revenues—
most notably public education—but only a minuscule
minority of the race were paying any property taxes.
T o say the least, that fact did not 'sit well' with white
taxpayers." (App.703a)(emphasis in original). "Whites
... were vehemently opposed to education of the former
slaves, believing that it undermined white supremacy
[W]hites deeply resented paying taxes . . . ' . . . to run
useless schools for the F r e e d m e n . ' " (App.704a)(quoting
Thornton D e p . , 50-52).
White supremacists soon returned to power and in 1875
enacted a n e w constitution. The district court found that
whites from the Black Belt region of Alabama were "intent
o n . . . using th[eir] n e w control to protect themselves from
the possibility that the black majorities in their counties
would ever again be able to use . . . political power . . . to
tax them in a way that would force them as the property
holders to cough up funds . . . which would be used to the
benefit of the majority of the people in the Black Belt w h o
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were black...." (App.717a-18a)(quoting Thornton Dep., at
67-68). "In order to obstruct black political office holders
from collecting substantial property taxes in the future,
property tax restrictions, or 'caps,' were for the first
time embedded into the text of an Alabama constitution."
(App.718a). "[T]he property tax caps targeted blacks for
a specific purpose. T h e property tax restrictions were
intended to prevent the possibility that taxes could again be
levied on the property of Alabama Planters in an onerous
amount for the purpose of educating blacks...." (App.719a21a) (emphasis by district court). "[T]he millage caps woven
into the fabric of the 1875 Constitution were motivated by
the fears... that blacks might again obtain political power,
and increase tax millage in order to fund 'radical' programs,
such as education for the Freedmen." (App.811a). The 1875
Constitution imposed a cap of 5 mills on any property tax
levied by a county or city.
T h e millage caps, with minor modification, were
again embodied in the 1901 Constitution, most of whose
provisions remain in effect today. T h e district court
concluded that "[t]he two most important issues to come
before the 1901 constitutional Convention, other than
disenfranchisement, were taxation and education. . . .
Delegates to the 1901 Constitutional Convention . . . were
opposed to the education of black children, and firmly
against the funding of black schools with white dollars."
(App.803a). "[S]tate and local property tax restrictions
w e r e adopted for the purpose of protecting white
taxpayers from the threats of 'black rule' and increased
taxation for the purpose of funding equitable and adequate
education opportunities . . . to blacks." (App. 814a) While
a pervasive theme of the 1901 Constitutional Convention
was the disenfranchisement of black citizens, "the records
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also clearly and convincingly establish that another
objective of nearly equal importance to a large majority
of the delegates w a s that of reaffirming those provisions
of the 1875 Constitution suppressing the millage rates of
ad valorem property taxes that could be devoted to the
support of black education at public expense." (App.l002a).
Sections 215 and 216 of the 1901 Constitution, like
provisions in the 1875 Constitution, limited county and
city property taxes each to 5 mills. Section 269 authorized
counties to levy an additional one mill tax for education,
subject to a n e w requirement. "[T]his optional tax
required, for thefirsttime in Alabama history, a voter
referendum, thus ensuring that only those w h o could vote
(i.e., whites) had the authority to raise taxes for education
in their counties." (App.810a)(emphasis in original). T h e
district court concluded that "[t]he evidence in the record
demonstrates that Sections . . . 215, 216 and 269 of the
1901 Alabama Constitution were enacted with a racially
discriminatory intent." (App.1019a).
The millage caps in sections 215 and 216 remain in
effect to this day. In the twentieth century, when blacks
had been largely disenfranchised, section 2 6 9 w a s
amended to authorize the imposition of other property
taxes for education, subject to a referendum requirement.
The net effect of those subsequent amendments is that the
effective millage cap on local property taxes for education
is n o w 15 mills.
The millage caps were of particular importance in
the Black Belt region, where whites owned virtually all
the land, but where the large majority of the school age
children were black. (App.716a-18a). Those ownership and
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demographic patterns persist. "While blacks accounted
for 26.35% of the State's total population in 2009, they
owned only about 3% of Alabama's agricultural acreage
and 2 % of its timber acreage." (App.933a). "In Marengo,
Lowndes, and Wilcox counties [in the Black Belt], black
agricultural acreage ownership was so low in 2007 that
the United States Department of Agriculture declined to
release black agricultural acreage ownership data in order
'to avoid disclosing data for individual farms,' yet blacks
constituted a majority of the population in each of those
counties in 2009." (App.934a-35a)(quoting PX493). A n d
in the Black Belt counties1, partially as a result of white
flight from the public schools following desegregation, the
county school systems are overwhelmingly black. In six of
the twelve Black Belt counties the county school system
is over 98% black, and in three of those counties there
are fewer than 10 white students in the school system.
(PX424; App.932a-25a).
T h e 1971 a n d 1978 Constitutional Limits o n
Property Assessments
Property assessments in A l a b a m a have long been
tainted by racial discrimination. For a time during
Reconstruction, "[u]nder Republican taxation, 'all
property of every description' w a s taxed by applying
a millage rate to the property's assessed, fair market
value." (App.699a). "[A]ll of a sudden African-American
tax assessors in the Black Belt are beginning to assess .
. . land at its real value, not at th[el artificially low value
1. The Black Belt counties are Barbour, Bullock, Dallas,
Greene, Hale, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Perry, Pickens, Sumter
and Wilcox Counties. (App.l23a).
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of 1865." (App.700a n. 1014)(quoting 1 Tr. 87). At the 1875
Convention, however," [white] delegates from the Black
Belt, where blacks retained an overwhelming numerical
majority of the population, and still held some of the local
offices, especially feared the black tax assessor w h o had
the legal ability to appraise property at afigure'injurious
to the economic interest of planters': i.e., at a monetary
value that was actually close to the property's fair and
reasonable value." (App.716a)(quoting 1 Tr. 89). Following
1875, "[w]ith tax officials loyal to the Democratic Party,
'the whites in the Black Belt were able to maintain very
low assessments of property.' Land began to be assessed
at much lower values than during Reconstruction, and
some parcels escaped taxation altogether." (App.732a-33a)
(quoting Norrell Tr., 40).
In m a n y counties ample funds for the white schools
were obtained by diverting state funding that should have
been used for the black schools; with the needs of the
white schools already met in this way, low assessment of
white-owned land assured that local taxes did not end up
being spent on the impecunious black schools. This system
w a s facilitated by a provision of the 1901 Constitution
that permitted local officials to divert to white schools
funds they received from the state based in part on the
n u m b e r of black students in the system. T h e district
court found that "what the [school] boards uniformly did
w a s disproportionately spend available revenues on the
education of white children at the expense of education of
black children. T h e result w a s the collection of property
taxes for the education of all school-age children, both white
and black, but allocation of an overwhelming proportion of
that revenue for the benefit of white children." (App.746a).
"[W]hite schools in the Black Belt were n o w getting all the
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money they need because the money is coming to them in
terms of... the total population, both white and black, but
effectively it's being spent almost all on the white students.
A n d that's a very small percentage, afifth,a sixth, to even
an eighth of the population in some of these counties."
(App.749a n. 1147)(quoting 1 Tr. 159-60). "[W]hite schools
located in the areas with a large black population—and
especially in the Black Belt, where whites constitute as
little as an eighth of the total population—were extremely
well funded. Accordingly, the Black Belt counties had no
incentive to seek further sources of revenue for education."
(App.748a-49a).
T h e district court concluded that up until 1971
"county tax assessors consistently undervalued property,
particularly in rural areas, and primarily to prevent
adequate funding for black schools." (App.l015a)(emphasis
added). T h e pattern of racially-motivated low property
assessments identified by the district court w a s possible
because under state law county assessors in practice
wielded standardless discretion to assign whatever value
they pleased to a piece of property.
In June 1971 that system of standardless discretion
w a s held unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to race.
Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F.Supp. 615 ( M . D . Ala. 1971)
(three judge court). At the time of the Weissinger decision,
essentially all property in Alabama w a s assessed at less
than its fair market value, but the ratio of assessed value
to fair market value varied widely from county to county.
That ratio ranged from a low of 6.7% in Hale County
(a Black Belt county) to a high of 26.8% in Jefferson
County (which includes Birmingham). Rural property
w a s assessed at an average ratio (12.1%) lower than
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property in urban areas (19.4%); the average statewide
ratio for all property w a s 16.9%. 330 F.Supp. at 625. T h e
court in Weissinger held that this variation in assessment
ratios violated Equal Protection, and directed county tax
officials (absent some other solution by the state) to use
a 60% ratio.
T h e order in Weissinger had the predictable effect of
forcing the Alabama Legislature to act. Unless the state
adopted some corrective measure of its o w n , the average
assessment ratio would have risen from 16.9% to 60%,
almost quadrupling the average property tax bill T h e
state could have addressed the immediate problem with
a relatively modest temporary measure; one proposal
would have required each county to temporarily reduce its
millage rate to the level at which its total revenue (based on
the court-mandated ratio of 60%) would remain the s a m e
as in the previous year. (PX55, at 9-11). Rural interests
favored a classification system, under which farms or
timberland would be assessed with a different ratio than
commercial land. That could have been accomplished by
amending the state constitution to permit different ratios,
and then establishing by statute a lower ratio for farms
and timberland (e.g., 40%) than the 60% ratio otherwise
mandated by state law. These more limited responses
would have solved the problem created by the Weissinger
decision without materially limiting the ability of counties
and cities to use property taxes for the public schools.
In the fall of 1971, however, Governor Wallace and
most white Alabama officials were incensed by federally
ordered desegregation of the Alabama public schools
(which received a majority of property tax revenues),
large numbers of white students werefleeingthe newly
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integrated schools, and it was widely feared that black
voters, increasingly enfranchised by the Voting Rights
Act, would in time elect local officials, particularly in
the majority-black Black Belt region of the state. (See
App.869a-882a). A chairman of the state Democratic Party
had earlier warned that "if you had a nigger tax assessor,"
he would increase the assessments of white-owned land.
The district court found that this "fear of an AfricanAmerican tax assessor was not unique . . . ; nearly all
white Alabamians w h o owned large tracts of agricultural
or timberland shared it." (App.869a)(quoting 2 Tr. 24-25).
The Legislature chose to respond to the problem
created by Weissinger by selecting measures that
sharply reduced the ability of future local officials to
raise revenues through property taxes. It adopted a
constitutional a m e n d m e n t that not only established a
classification system in the constitution itself, but also set
specific ratios at low levels intended (on average) to freeze
assessments close to the levels at which they had been set
prior to Weissinger. Under A m e n d m e n t 325, commercial
property was to be assessed at 25% of its fair market value,
while farms, timberland and residential property were to
be assessed at 15% of their fair market values. (App.430a).
A m e n d m e n t 325 permitted different ratios to be utilized
in individual counties, but only the state legislature—not
the counties themselves—were authorized to adopt such
variations.
In 1978 the Legislature approved A m e n d m e n t 373,
which reduced even further the assessed value of property,
and constrained in new ways the authority of local tax
assessors and county officials.

11
First, A m e n d m e n t 373 lowered the assessment ratios
to 20% for commercial property and 10% for agricultural
property, timberland, and single family residences.
Second, recognizing that the ratio reduction and other
provisions of A m e n d m e n t 373 could well reduce current
and future tax revenues, the A m e n d m e n t authorized
counties and cities to increase their millage rates above
the limits provided in the state Constitution if anticipated
tax receipts under A m e n d m e n t 373 were less than 120%
of the tax receipts for 1977-78. The authority to do so,
however, expressly expired in September 1979 (or if
revenues were lower than anticipated, in September
1980). Prior to 1981, white officials still controlled the
county commissions in all but a single county in Alabama,
but it was obvious to all that this was about to change;
between 1980 and 1985, after this special provision had
expired, blacks were elected to a majority of the county
commissions infiveBlack Belt counties. (PX350, 351).
Third, and most importantly, A m e n d m e n t 373
accorded owners of agricultural property and timberland
the option of having their property assessed (prior
to the application of the 10% ratio) based on "current
use valuation," and empowered the state legislature to
establish a statutory method for fixing that valuation,
effectively displacing county assessors from their
longstanding exclusive authority to determine the value
of such property. This was, as the district court held,
"[t]he most fundamental change in preexisting law wrought
by A m e n d m e n t 373." (App.98a). In Alabama today more
than 60% of all land is now valued under the "statutory
method" established by the legislature for assessing
agricultural land and timberland, rather than based on
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fair market value determined by the county tax assessor,
(PX387). In the Black Belt counties the figure is even
higher; in six of those counties over 80% of the land is
assessed under the statutory formula fixed by the state
legislature, rather than the actual fair market value
determined by the county assessor. (Id.). Today there are
black tax assessors in most of the Black Belt counties;
but because of A m e n d m e n t 373, it is the state legislature,
not those elected assessors, which actually determines
the assessment of most of the farms and timberland—
virtually all of it still white-owned—in those and all other
counties.
The complex formulas established by the legislature
under A m e n d m e n t 373 generally assign to agricultural
land and timberland values far below their fair market
value; on average that land is assessed at 27.4% of its
actual value. (PX387, line 69). T h e average fair market
value of that land is $1,679 per acre; the average value
assigned per acre under the statutory method is only
$461. (Id.). The assessed value of that acre, applying the
10% ratio, is only $46.12. The m a x i m u m permissible local
property tax for the support of public schools, applying
the 15 mill cap, is a mere 69 cents.2 A $1 million farm or
timber plantation would under the statutory method thus
be valued on average at about $274,000, have an assessed
value of $27,400, and be subject to a m a x i m u m tax for the
support of the public schools of a paltry $411.

2. "[P]roperty tax revenues from timber lands, which
constitute seventy-one percent of Alabama's geographic land
mass, average less than $1.00 per acre and account for only two
percent of all property tax revenue." Knight v. Alabama, 458
F.Supp.2d at 1298.
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PROCEEDINGS B E L O W
T h e millage caps of the 1901 Constitution and the
assessment provisions of A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 were
first challenged in Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp,2d
1273 (N.D.Al??a. 2004). Knight w a s a continuation of
longstanding litigation regarding the desegregation of
the Alabama institutions of higher education. The district
court in Knight found that both the millage caps and
the assessment provisions amendments were racially
motivated; it concluded, however, that relief for those
constitutional violations was not within the scope of the
higher education claim in Knight 458 F.Supp.2d at 1312.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on that ground. 476 F.3d
1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 551 U . S . 1146
(2007).
The instant action w a sfiledshortly thereafter. T h e
plaintiffs argued that the state defendants were bound by
the finding in Knight that all of the challenged provisions
were racially motivated. T h e district judge, however,
decided to retry the issues that had been litigated in
Knight M o s t of the facts bearing on the plaintiffs'
constitutional claims in both cases are not in dispute,
and are detailed in the two district court opinions. T h e
determination of the plaintiffs' claims turns largely on
disputes about the controlling legal standards.
T h e district court below concluded, as had the
district court in Knight, that the millage caps in the 1901
Constitution were motivated by racial discrimination.
(App.1019a). T h e district court held, however, that proof of
an invidious motive is insufficient to establish a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause; the court insisted that
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the plaintiffs were also required to show that the millage
caps had injured black public school students more than
they had injured white pubic school students. The court
concluded that the racially-motivated millage caps,
although harmful to the black plaintiffs in this case,
were equally harmful to white children, and thus were
constitutional. (App.l029a). T h e district court rejected
the challenge to A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373, holding that
those amendments had been enacted in order to avoid the
tax increases that would otherwise have resulted from the
Weissinger decision. (App.l019a-20a). Although finding
that the artificially low pre-Weissinger tax assessments
were "primarily" motivated by race, the district court
held that under Eleventh Circuit precedent the deliberate
perpetuation of those race-based assessment levels by
A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 w a s not unconstitutional.
(App.1015a).
T h e court of appeals affirmed on other grounds the
rejection of plaintiffs' challenge to the 1901 Constitution.
It held that the black plaintiffs lacked standing to
challenge the race-based millage caps because they
could not show that officials in the counties where they
lived would necessarily choose to increase the millage
rates if the caps were set aside. (App.11a-13a). With
regard to A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373, the court of appeals
rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the district court had
applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating their
intent claim and plaintiffs' claim that the amendments
unconstitutionally perpetuated the pre-Weissinger
discriminatory assessments. (App.24a).
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This is one of the rare cases in which the lower
courts' departure from the legal standards established
by decisions of this Court is of such extraordinary
importance as to warrant review by this Court. T h e
Alabama constitutional restrictions at issue have with
cruel effectiveness resulted in "a shamefully neglected and
grossly underfunded public school system." (App.631a).
The court of appeals rejected the challenge to the
racially motivated millage caps on the ground that this
type of violation—adopted for the purpose of preventing
future elected officials from taxing white-owned land in
order to educate black as well as white students— is one
which under Article III the federal courts are powerless
to redress. The challenge to the assessment restrictions
failed, in part, because it was resolved by Judge Smith
in the instant case, rather than by Judge Murphy, w h o
decided Knight The consequences of this litigation for tens
of thousands of current Alabama public school children,
and for countless others in the years ahead, are simply
too great to rest on such grounds. These are not problems
which can be addressed through the normal democratic
process; the very purpose of the Alabama constitutional
restrictions was to strip local elected officials of the legal
authority to impose the property taxes needed to support
the public schools.
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I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT
BLACK CHILDREN A N D PARENTS LACK
STANDING TO C H A L L E N G E RACIALLY
MOTIVATED PROPERTY TAX RESTRICTIONS
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF
THIS COURT
The district court concluded that the millage caps in
the 1901 Constitution were adopted for the purpose of
limiting the extent to which property taxes could be used
to pay for the education of black children. The court of
appeals did not question the correctness of thatfinding.It
concluded, however, that black children and their parents
lack standing to challenge this type of constitutional
violation.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that black plaintiffs
lack standing because, even if the millage caps were struck
down, there could be no increase in property taxes—and
thus no increase in school funding—unless local officials
subsequently chose to adopt ordinances, or the state later
opted to enact statutes, which increased the millage rate.
"[I]t is undisputed that further legislation is necessary
to achieve higher millage rates, and 'the contingency of
[legislative] action makes the redress of plaintiffs' injury
. . . speculative.'.... The Alabama Legislature (and the
people of Alabama) m a y choose to maintain the status quo
or lower the rates, and w e can only guess as to whether
the removal of the current millage caps will redress the
plaintiffs' injury," (App.11a)(quoting Medina v. Clinton,
86 F.3d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1996)). T h e court of appeals
refused to engage in "guesswork as to h o w independent
decisionmakers"—e.g., the county commissioners
otherwise empowered to increase millage rates—"will
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exercise their judgment." (Id.)(quoting Clapper v.
Amnesty Int'l. 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013)). T h e 1875 and
1901 Constitutions structured the governmental process
so that individuals w h o favor millage rates over certain
levels were required to obtain an a m e n d m e n t to the
state constitution. The Eleventh Circuit insisted that the
structuring of government to create such a legal barrier
does not by itself inflict a cognizable injury. (App.l2a13a). T h e existence of such barriers, it held, even if "put
in place for a discriminatory purpose, is not sufficient,
in and of itself, to confer standing." (App.l3a). Under the
Eleventh Circuit standard, a plaintiff could have standing
only if there had been a pre-1875 millage rate in some
county which exceeded the current caps, and which had
not been repealed in the intervening 139 years; in that
unlikely situation invalidation of the caps would bring
the pre-existing rate back into force. But a restriction
that operates prospectively cannot give rise to standing,
the Eleventh Circuit insisted, because a court m a y not
"guess" what future state or local officials would do if the
restriction were removed.
T h e Eleventh Circuit's decision is inconsistent
with a series of decisions of this Court holding that the
creation of a prospective barrier to obtaining favorable
government action creates a cognizable injury. In
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U . S . 385 (1969), this Court held
unconstitutional a city charter provision which required
that any ordinance related to housing discrimination be
approved by referendum. T h e invalidated requirement
"not only suspended the operation of [a]n existing
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also
required the approval of the electors before any future
ordinance could take effect." 393 U . S . at 389-90. Hunter
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emphasized that it did not hold that the "mere repeal of
an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the
Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t " 393 U . S . at 390 n. 5. Crawford
v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U . S . 527 (1982), m a d e
clear that the constitutional violation and cognizable
injury in such cases is the barrier to future governmental
action, not any repeal of a pre-existing measure. T h e
provision at issue in Crawford eliminated the state law
obligation of school boards to use busing for the purpose
of desegregation, but left local school officials free to
engage in such measures in the future. T h e Court held
that the "the Equal Protection Clause is not violated
by mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies."
458 U . S . at 538. Crawford explained that Hunter w a s
distinguishable because it "involved more than a 'mere
repeal' of the fair housing ordinance: persons seeking
anti-discrimination housing laws—presumptively racial
minorities—were 'singled out for mandatory referendums
while no other g r o u p . . . face[d] that obstacle.'" 458 U . S . at
541 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U . S . 137, 142 (1971))
(emphasis added). Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 458 U . S . 457 (1982), struck down an initiative which
operated prospectively to forbid school boards to assign
students to a non-neighborhood school for the purpose
of desegregation. Although the initiative also had the
effect of repealing a busing plan that had earlier been
adopted in the city of Seattle, the Court m a d e clear that
it was the prospective restructuring of the government
process, not that repeal, which violated Equal Protection.
"Our analysis . . . has nothing to do with whether school
board action predates that taken by the State. Instead,
what w efindobjectionable about [the] Initiative . . . is the
comparative burden it imposes on minority participation
in the political process." 458 U . S . at 480 n . 2 3 . "[The]
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[initiative . . . works something more than the 'mere
repeal' of a desegregation law by the political entity that
created it. It burdens all future attempts to integrate
Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a
n e w and remote level of government." 458 U . S . at 483.
T h e Eleventh Circuit held that the millage caps,
which obstruct "all future attempts" of the plaintiffs
to obtain school property tax rates over those caps,
create no cognizable injury, because a court could only
speculate about whether those efforts would succeed in
the absence of the caps. But this is precisely the type
of injury deemed cognizable in Hunter, Crawford, and
Washington. This Court did not require the plaintiffs in
Hunter to demonstrate the likelihood that Akron would
in the future adopt housing nondiscrimination ordinances.
Similarly, Romer
v .Evans,517 U.S. 620 (1996), did not
demand that the plaintiffs in that case prove that—but for
the constitutional amendment there at issue—Colorado
officials would in the future adopt new measures designed
to forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
In the instant case, the court of appeals acknowledged that
the millage caps were "impediments to public education
funding arising from . . . state laws." (App.7a). Under
the decisions of this Court, the existence of such an
impediment that " m a d e it substantially more difficult to
secure the enactment of ordinances" is sufficient by itself
to establish standing. Hunter, 393 U . S . at 390.
The court of appeals also argued that, even if it were
certain that county officials would adopt millage rates over
the caps if those caps were held unconstitutional, the black
plaintiffs in this particular case would still lack standing,
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because they could not prove that those increases would
also be approved by voters at a referendum. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that because voters in two earlier
referenda had rejected millage increases in Sumter
and Lawrence Counties, "an injunction prohibiting
enforcement of the millage caps will not likely redress
the plaintiffs' injury," (App. 12a). But Hunter, Washington
and Romer do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate
that he or she is "likely" to obtain favorable government
action—from government officials or as a result of
a referendum— if an unconstitutional impediment is
removed. A n d standing assuredly should not depend on
judicial predictions about the results of future referenda.
In this case the Lawrence County referendum on which
the Eleventh Circuit relied was held 24 years ago, and the
voters then divided along racial lines.3 The Sumter County
referendum was marred by "informal communications
[that] threatened black voters, m a n y of w h o m did not o w n
their homes, with increases in their rents and even loss of
their jobs."4 It would be unsound, and indeed unseemly,
for the federal judges to deny standing to black plaintiffs
on the assumption that such racial differences will forever
guarantee the defeat of property tax referenda.

3. Affidavit of D w a y n e Key, Exhibit B . In the majority white
precincts only 37.8 % of the voters favored the increase, while in
the majority black precincts 60.8% of the votes were in favor.
4.

Affidavit of Bobby Singleton, at 5.
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II. T H E L O W E R COURTS' REJECTION OF
T H E INTENT-BASED C H A L L E N G E TO
A M E N D M E N T S 325 A N D 373 RESTS ON
STANDARDS THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
This is the second lawsuit challenging as racially
motivated the assessment restrictions in A m e n d m e n t s 325
and 373. In Knight v. Alabama in 2004, Judge M u r p h y
found that these restrictions on the ability of local officials
to assess property were racially motivated. W h e n relief
for that violation w a s denied in Knight on other grounds,
the instant action wasfiledasserting the same claims. In
2011 Judge Smith concluded that Amendments 325 and 373
had been adopted to avoid the sharp increase in property
taxes threatened by Weissinger.
The intent-based challenge in the instant case to
the restrictions in A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 is the same
as the claim adjudicated in Knight The plaintiffs in the
two cases relied on testimony from the same historical
experts and the same economist. T h e entire record of
the trial in Knight w a s placed in evidence in the instant
case. T h e same attorney w a s the lead trial counsel for
plaintiffs in both cases, as was a principal trial attorney
for the defendants. T h e lead plaintiff in Knight w a s a
key witness in this case. In the instant case Judge Smith
repeatedly relied on evidence from Knight and quoted
Judge Murphy's opinion in that case. Almost all of the
subsidiary facts in the two cases were undisputed, and the
description of those circumstances in the 2004 and 2011
opinions are entirely consistent. The differing outcomes
of the two trials of these intent claims occurred because
Judge Smith in his 2011 decision applied different legal
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standards than did Judge Murphy in his 2004 opinion.
The standards applied in the instant case were in several
critical respects inconsistent with the Equal Protection
standards established by decisions of this Court.
(1) Judge Smith and Judge M u r p h y framed in
significantly different m a n n e r s the question that
controlled the outcome of these claims. In his 2011 opinion
Judge Smith concluded that Amendments 325 and 373
were required to solve the problem created by Weissinger.
O n the other hand, Judge Murphy in 2004 determined
that particular aspects of those Amendments, the specific
solutions selected to solve the Weissinger problem, were
framed for racial reasons. The difference between those
questions w a s of dispositive importance.
Judge Smith believed that the rejection of plaintiffs'
intent claim was required by the fact that Amendments
325 and 373 were prompted by the need to address the
crisis created by Weissinger. "Amendments 325 and 373 .
. . were a reaction to the increases in property appraisals
and assessments mandated by the Weissinger decision,
and the accompanying threat of a tremendous increase In
the property taxes paid by large landowners." (App.1015a).
" A m e n d m e n t 373 . . . was enacted with the support of the
F a r m Bureau, and it is clear that the Bureau still was
intent on ensuring that the wealthy owners of large tracts
of farm properties and timber lands would not experience
a significant tax increase. The much delayed Weissinger
deadline loomed large on the economic horizon of the
large landowners, and it became clear that A m e n d m e n t
325 was not sufficient to stifle the impending tax burden."
(App.1013a). T h e "force motivating the adoption of
A m e n d m e n t [was] the A l a b a m a F a r m Bureau. T h e
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F a r m Bureau, representing the interests of Black Belt
Planters and other, extremely-large landholders, w a s
especially keen to see some form of property tax relief
passed in the wake of the Weissinger decision. Otherwise,
its constituents would face enormous ad valorem tax
increases . . . . " (App.1008a)(emphasis added).
Judge Murphy's 2004 opinion, on the other hand,
focused more specifically on why the legislature selected the
particular solutions to the Weissinger problem, solutions
which drastically limited the authority of local officials.
"[A]ll tax policy m a d e or revised in the 20th century has
effectively been m a d e to conform with the commitments
of taxation capped by constitutional mandate, reinforced
by limits on local control, local authority to tax, and that
of course was the result of fears, especially a m o n g Black
Belt counties, that in the future some reenfranchised black
electorate would raise property taxes." 458 F.Supp.2d at
1296 (emphasis added). "Black Belt and urban industrial
interests successfully used the argument that it is unfair
for white property owners to pay for the education of
blacks to produce all the state constitutional barriers to
property taxes from 1875 to the present, including the
1971 and 1978 . . . amendments." Knight v. Alabama, 458
F.Supp. 2d at 1297 (emphasis added).
It is of controlling importance w h e t h e r the
constitutional challenge turns on the motive for responding
at all to Weissinger, or is determined more specifically
by what motivated the legislature to respond in a w a y
that not only would avoid immediate tax increases (thus
solving the Weissinger problem), but also would create
"limits on local control" and "barriers" to future taxes. In
the absence of legislative action, the Weissinger decision
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meant that property taxes would quadruple in 1972. But
while the need to respond to Weissinger explains w h y
the Legislature adopted some solution to the problem, it
does not explain w h y the Legislature did so by imposing
the disputed "limits" and "barriers." T h e Weissinger
problem could have been solved by a proposal before
the legislature that would have "provided for a one-time
millage adjustment at the local level to insure that taxes
would not be increased through equalization." (PX55
at 9-11). A different level of assessments for farms and
timberland than for commercial property could have been
achieved simply by providing a lower ratio (e.g., 40%)
for farms and timberland than the 60% ratio that would
have applied to other property. Either of these solutions
would have left unencumbered the ability of future county
officials to levy the property taxes needed for schools.
But the legislature instead chose to solve the
Weissinger problem in a manner that severely limited
that local authority. First, both amendments went beyond
providing different ratios for different types of land to
constitutionally mandate extremely low ratios. Second,
A m e n d m e n t 373 authorized the legislature to regulate
the assessment of farms and timberland by establishing
a legislative formula for calculating so-called "current use
value," effectively restructuring Alabama government in
a w a y that transferred to the legislature the assessment
authority that prior to 1978 had been the exclusive
province of county assessors. Third, although A m e n d m e n t
373 gave county commissioners w h o wanted to maintain or
even increase revenues by up to 20% the authority to raise
millage rates above the constitutional caps if necessary
to do so in light of the lowered assessments, it limited
that power to commissioners w h o were in office prior to
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October 1980, a time w h e n whites remained in control of
66 of the 67 county commissions in Alabama. (PX135).
Landowners could have been protected from large tax
increases without taking any of these specific steps, and
nothing in Judge Smith's 2011 opinion purports to address
w h y those prospective restrictions were chosen over other
approaches that would not have hamstrung future county
officials.
Judge Smith's 2011 o w n opinion contains a n u m b e r
of subsidiary findings that would readily explain these
prospective restrictions: fear of the future election
of black county officials5 and animus toward support
for the n o w integrated schools6 which whites, at the
urging of Governor Wallace, were fleeing in favor of
private, segregated academies. 7 Judge M u r p h y relied
on precisely these very circumstances in concluding that
the prospective restrictions on assessments were racially
motivated. But because Judge Smith mistakenly focused
on w h y the legislature had decided to solve the Weissinger
problem at all, rather than inquiring into the motives for
the particular solutions selected, those circumstances
were to him irrelevant.
This central premise of Judge Smith's decision is
inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. Even where
the overall goal of a law is itself entirely legitimate, the
legislature m a y not rely on race in selecting the m a n n e r
in which that goal will be achieved. For example, although
5. App.866a, 868a-69a, 881a.
6. App.845a-46a, 870a-71a, 874a-75a, 877a-80a, 1049a.
7. App.859a-61a, 871a and n. 1478.
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states every decade adopt n e w districting plans because
of demographic changes, and sometimes because of an
increase or decrease in the n u m b e r of congressional
seats to which they are entitled, this Court has held
that the Equal Protection Clause could be violated if the
boundaries of a particular district were race-based. Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U . S . 630 (1993). Under this Court's decisions
the controlling question here is w h y the legislature, after
deciding to avoid the sharp increase in overall taxes that
would have occurred under Weissinger, selected as the
method of doing so a scheme which stripped county and
city officials of the ability to tax the vast majority of the
actual value of local property. T h e fatalflawof the decision
below is not that it decided this issue incorrectly, but that
it did not decide this issue at all.
(2) Judge Smith believed that plaintiffs were required
to prove a racial motive, not only behind the action of the
legislature, but also in the public vote to ratify each of
the disputed amendments. "[I]t must be shown that those
amendments were drafted by their sponsors, adopted by
the State Legislature, and ratified by the citizens because
of their racially adverse effects." (App.1002a)(emphasis
added and omitted). "[R]acially-discriminatory intent
must have been a 'substantial' or 'motivating,' factor
in each step of the process." (App.l002a-03a)(emphasis
added).
That legal standard w a s of decisive importance in this
case. T h e voters themselves had no role in selecting the
particular solutions embodied in A m e n d m e n t s 325 and
373; thus the voters could not be said to have m a d e racebased decisions regarding the selection of those aspects
of the amendments. A n d the public w a s never given the
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option of voting for a plan that would have avoided large
tax increases without limiting future local control of
property tax revenues. T h e legislature structured the
referendum on A m e n d m e n t 325 in a manner that forced
voters to approve the A m e n d m e n t regardless of those
restrictions. "Because a defeat of A m e n d m e n t 325 would
result in statewide application of the backup-bill's thirty
percent assessment ratio, a 'no' vote w a s essentially a
vote for a thirty percent ratio on homes, while proposed
A m e n d m e n t 325 called for a fifteen percent assessment
ratio. O n e commentator highlighted the 'quandary'
presented to the electorate in this way: ' " D o you think
I'm a nut?" a voter m a y mull. "Thirty per cent is double
15 percent, and I'm paying too much tax already. W h o
would vote for 30 percent?"' (App.902a)(quoting P X 2 2 3 ,
at 2). "[T]he packaging of the amendment and the backup bill essentially left the voter with only one choice."
(App.903a-04a).
This Court's decisions emphatically do not require
proof that an improper motive (with regard to an entire
enactment or some aspect of it) w a s present "in each
step" of the decisionmaking process. T h e controlling
question is whether the provision at issue would not
have been adopted but for that impermissible purpose.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U . S . 252, 271 n. 21 (1977). In a
bicameral legislature, one body might include a provision
for an invidious reason, while the other body then passed
the entire proposal simply because it wanted to adjourn
for the s u m m e r recess. A n improper motive that existed
at only a single part of a multi-step process could still
be the but-for cause of the final provision. See Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, 131 S . C t 1186 (2011). Thus, for example,
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if in this case the legislature for racial reasons limited
the A m e n d m e n t 373 cap-disregard provision to county
commissioners in office prior to November 1980, and the
public then approved A m e n d m e n t 373 simply because
it lowered the assessment ratio for private homes from
15% to 10%, race would still be the but-for cause of that
November 1980 cutoff.

III. THE L O W E R COURTS' REJECTION OF THE
CLAIM THAT A M E N D M E N T S 325 A N D 373
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERPETUATE PRIOR
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES RESTS ON A
STANDARD THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
The courts below held that Alabama did not violate
Equal Protection by deliberately perpetuating race-based
pre-1971 assessment levels. The district court findings
squarely presented this issue. That court concluded
that prior to 1971 "county tax assessors consistently
undervalued property, particularly in rural areas,
and primarily to prevent adequate funding for black
schools." (App.l015a)(emphasis added). Through the
adoption of Amendments 325 and 373, "Alabama chose
to entrench its historically low property assessments into
the Constitution . . . ." (App.24a)(quoting brief for state);
see Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1295 ("the
Legislature further . . . amend[ed] the state constitution
to preserve the status quo of historically low property
taxes."). T h e district court opinion detailed the repeated
and ultimately successful efforts to enact state measures
that would perpetuate the pre-Weissinger primarily
race-based assessment levels. (App.887a-88a, 891a-93a,
1012a-13a). "The challenged provisions of the Alabama
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Constitution, particularly the 'current use' and 'lid bill'
aspects added to the State's organic law by A m e n d m e n t s
325 and 373, arguably are a continuation in practical, but
not in legal, terms of the . . . period . . . when county tax
assessors undervalued property . . . primarily to prevent
adequate funding for black schools." (App.1015a).
The district court clearly understood the plaintiffs
to claim that the deliberate perpetuation of the
racially motivated pre-Weissinger assessments w a s
unconstitutional. "[P]laintiff's challenge is . . . that the
system created in response to the mandate in Weissinger
I is unconstitutional because it w a s devised as a means of
perpetuating, as much as possible, the same anemic ad
valorem tax revenues generated by a system that had
been devised with the racially discriminatory intent of
minimizing monies available for the education of black
children." (App.464a).
The district court concluded, however, that rejection
of this perpetuation claim w a s mandated by the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405
F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Johnson v. Bush, 546 U . S . 1015 (2005).
In Johnson the court addressed a felony
disenfranchisement provision enacted in Florida
in 1968 that w a s based upon a predecessor
provision enacted in 1868—a predecessor that
the court assumed, for purposes of argument,
to have been motivated by racial animus. . . .
[T]he challenged provision w a s held to be
"constitutional because it w a s substantively
altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence
of any evidence of racial bias."

30
(App.616a)(quoting Johnson)(emphasis added). Applying
the reasoning of that Eleventh Circuit decision, the district
court held that it was constitutional for A m e n d m e n t s
325 and 373 to intentionally perpetuate the race-based
pre-Weissinger assessments, because the Amendments
deliberately perpetuated those earlier constitutional
violations through a method that "substantively altered"
the original scheme.
A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 undoubtedly were
devised for the purpose of avoiding the dramatic
changes in Alabama's property tax structure
portended by the decision of a three-judge
federal court in Weissinger.... Even so, there
is little doubt that each of those A m e n d m e n t s
'substantively altered' the property tax
assessment scheme that precipitated the
decision. Thus, Johnson indicates that this
court must determine whether... Amendments
325 and 373 were "motivated by a desire to
discriminate against blacks on account of race
...." Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U . S . at 233....
(App.617a). A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 "substantively
altered" the pre-Weissinger system because they
achieved roughly the same result, not (as was the practice
before Weissinger) through individualized discretionary
assessments of particular plots of land, but by creating
ratios and formulas specifically devised to result in the
same overall exceedingly low level of assessments. T h e
district court held that the deliberate perpetuation
of the pre-Weissinger race-based assessment levels
w a s constitutional because it had been achieved in a
manner that involved a "substantive[] alter[ation]" of the
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earlier method. (App.1015a-16a). T h e court of appeals
rejected without explanation plaintiffs' argument that
Amendments 325 and 373 unconstitutionally perpetuated
earlier discrimination.
This "substantively altered" standard is clearly
inconsistent with this Court's decisions regarding
government practices that perpetuate the effect of
previous discrimination. Following this Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U . S . 483
(1954), southern states adopted a number of different
student plans that "substantively altered" the racebased assignments held impermissible in Brown. In
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of the City of Jackson, 391
U . S . 450 (1968), the school board assigned all students
without regard to race to their neighborhood schools,
but gave them the option of transferring back to the
schools to which they had once been assigned on the
basis of race. In Green v. County School Board of New
Kent County, 391 U . S . 430 (1968), the board adopted a
"freedom of choice" plan, which permitted students to
attend whichever school they selected. This Court held
both plans unconstitutional, because as a practical matter
they resulted in the same racial attendance patterns that
had existed prior to Brown. In Myers v. Anderson, 238
U . S . 368 (1915), Annapolis limited the franchise to city
taxpayers with at least $500 in assessed property, but
exempted from that requirement male descendants of
any person eligible to vote prior to 1868 in Maryland or
any other state. This system "substantively altered" pre1868 laws that prohibited blacks from voting; blacks could
vote if they had the requisite property, or if they were
descendants of persons who prior to 1868 lived in states
where blacks could vote. This Court nonetheless held that
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so-called "grandfather clause" unconstitutional because it
perpetuated, albeit in an altered form, the effects of prior
discriminatory registration requirements.

IV. THIS C A S E P R E S E N T S ISSUES OF
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE
T h e truly exceptional practical importance of the
issues and claims in this case weighs heavily in favor of
review by this Court. "The effect of low property tax
revenues has had a crippling effect on poor, majority
black school districts
In rural areas of the state, most
local school districts simply do not have a critical mass of
valuable commercial property and residential homes—the
two types of property shouldering eighty-five percent of
the property taxes—to raise adequate funds for public
education." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1299.
[R]acism, and the resulting determination to
maintain the politics of "white supremacy"
at all costs, has obstructed educational
progress in Alabama since the Civil W a r . The
result has been a shamefully neglected and
grossly underfunded public school system....
[N]o group has historically suffered more from
Alabama's lack of an equitable and adequate
public school system than African-Americans
?? ?? ?? ??

(App.631a). "Alabama's per capita property tax and
revenues are the lowest of all fifty states—the State
collects only $250 in property taxes per person— Florida
collected almost four times more, while Georgia collected
almost three times more property taxes per person than
Alabama." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1297.
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A l a b a m a continues to b e plagued by a n
inadequately funded public school system—
one that hinders the upward mobility of her
citizens, black and white alike, especially in
rural counties
[As a result,] [t]he children of
the rural poor, whether black or white, are left
to struggle as best as they can in underfunded,
dilapidated schools.
(App.l044a). Amendments 325 and 373, "by constitutionally
keeping the property tax base at a mere fraction of the
property's value, guarantee[] that no level of millage rates
will produce minimally adequate property taxes." Knight
v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1298. Black Belt counties
often do not have sufficient funds to provide their students
with text books.8
This woefully inadequate funding is not the choice
of the elected officials in the Black Belt; the repeated
restructuring of A l a b a m a government has left those
officials with no real ability to raise sufficient property
tax revenues. W h e n local funding for public schools is
inadequate, ordinarily "the ultimate solutions must come
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures
of those w h o elect them." San Antonio Ind. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U . S . 1, 59-59 (1972). But in this case
Alabama has deliberately reallocated governmental power
so that the elected officials in the Black Belt are unable
to provide such solutions.
This Court has long scrutinized with particular care
governmental structuring of this sort. Neither Hunter v.
8. 7 Tr. 18-19, 74, 82-83, 112-13.
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Erickson nor any of its progeny involved a circuit split.
Structuring schemes are typically idiosyncratic in nature,
and for that reason different circuits do not have occasion
to pass on the constitutionality of the same scheme. Like
the schemes in Hunter, Washington, and Romer, the
particular Alabama system w a s framed in response to
local circumstances. It is the crippling and permanent
nature of these types of restrictions that prompted this
Court to grant plenary review in Hunter, Washington, and
Romer, and which warrants review in the instant case. The
impact of the Alabama constitutional provisions on tens of
thousands of Black Belt school children, and on countless
others in the state, is assuredly as important as the effect
of the Colorado constitutional provision at issue in Romer,
and the racial motives in the instant case implicate the
core concerns of the Equal Protection Clause.
T h e Court should grant review of all of the three
questions presented. The millage caps and the assessment
restrictions work in tandem, and the subsidiary issues
they raise are inextricably intertwined. T h e caps and
assessment restrictions are part of a single scheme,
conceived in defiance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, nurtured over the course of a century of Jim
Crow, and enhanced to thwart the purposes of the Voting
Rights Act, It is a scheme which has been all too effective
in achieving its goal of assuring that Black Belt officials
elected by black voters have little ability to require white
landowners to pay taxes that could be used to educate
black children. A n d it is a scheme which will continue to
deny an adequate education to generations of Alabama
public school students unless this Court acts.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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